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The environmental quality of destination has become a tool that hotels have to 
hold the tourism demand. In this paper we are going to present a model of vertical 
differentiation in the accommodation industry, where differentiation is associated 
with quality. Additionally, we assume the existence of a lump sum tax in the 
accommodation industry. Two are the main results which will be proved in this 
article; first, if the tourist's willingness to pay for quality increases then both the 
demand and the price for tourism services increase as a result. However, the 
increment of the demand for best environmental quality gets higher, and 
therefore, the environmental quality level of tourism services, that the destination 
offers, decreases. Second, an increase in the value of the tourism tax leads to an 
increase in the total environmental quality of the destination.  
 
Keywords: duopoly, tourism demand, hotel service quality, environment. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The last years have seen a significant growth in the tourism sector, 
and in particular in the activities related to the accommodation industry. 
For instance, the international tourism receipts increased from 207 in 
1990 up to 586 billons of Euros in 2006 (data from (UNWT, 2007)). This 
new scenario has led the importance of the quality of tourism service to a 
better standard. 
Moreover, an important share of the tourism sector is its 
interdependency with the environmental quality of the destination. On one 
hand, tourism, as well as all the economics activities, directly affects the 
environment. The tourism sector and policy makers are interested in 
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investing on the environmental quality and on a sustainable utilization of 
the local resources. However, on the other hand, the tourism sector 
depends on the natural environment; the environmental quality of a 
tourism destination is therefore an important tool that hotels have to hold 
the tourism demand. Many articles have studied this aspect: for example 
(Fick and Ritchie, 1991) shows that the success of a tourism destination 
depends critically on the quality of the services they guarantee. In this 
respect, (González and León, 2001), in their study about the adoption of 
environmental innovations in the hotel industry of Gran Canaria (Spain), 
found out that hotels have strategic opportunities to improve their net 
profits through an effective environmental management. These authors 
show that environmental innovations have a positive impact on tourism 
demand, and that the public policies can also contribute, through 
incentives for environmental investments and the diffusion of information 
on environmental measures. Such a strong interdependency with the 
environmental quality leads to important consequences. For example 
(Pintassilgo and Silva, 2007) showed that open market access leads to an 
overexploitation in respect to economy and environment; as they proved, 
"Present research shows that tourism can destroy tourism". In fact, these 
authors recommend limiting the number of firms through many policy 
instruments such as the use of taxes. 
As a result of this interdependency, it can be said that the 
environmental quality of a tourism region is mainly produced by the 
accommodation industry. For example, one of the key objectives shared 
by the biggest hotel chains is the maintenance of bathing water and good 
beach quality. The animal protection in the nearest of hotels also plays a 
big rule. Nevertheless, a reduction of environmental impact, through 
small systematic steps, such as improvements in eco-efficiency can be a 
huge factor as well. In addition, a good managing of the accommodation 
industry in respect to the environment `produces' the quality of the 
tourism destination. In this paper it is taken into account the 
environmental quality as the quality of the tourism service offered by the 
accommodation industry. 
From a tourist point of view, the importance of the environmental 
quality is out of the question, since tourists are mainly interested in it. In 
this respect, (Huybers and Bennet, 2000) analyze the impact of the 
environment on holiday destination choices of prospective UK tourists. 
These authors found out that tourists are willing to pay more in order to 
visit a destination with high environmental quality (see also (Sinclair and 
Stabler, 1997) and (Clewer, 1992)). From all those studies appears clear 
that environmental quality is important for tourists and that in a large 
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number of cases, they are willing to pay for quality. This is another 
peculiar characteristic of the tourism demand, and one of the components 
of the model analyzed in this paper. 
Many studies in tourism economics focus on the horizontal 
differentiation of the accommodation industry. In particular, (Calveras, 
2003), (Accinelli et al., 2006), (Brida and Pereyra, 2008a) and (Brida and 
Pereyra, 2008b), studied a model where tourists are characterized by their 
location. This kind of horizontal differentiation is called Hotelling-type 
models. In this paper, it is adopted a model of vertical differentiation 
where all tourists have the same ranking of quality; in fact all tourists 
agree that high quality is better, but they differ on their willingness to pay 
for it. However this two models seem to be very different, (Cremer and 
Thisse, 1991) have proved that the Hottelling model is a special case of a 
vertical product differentiation model. In this sense, the model that we 
present in this article, works in a larger range of action than the models 
above. An interesting model of vertical differentiation in tourism 
economics is the one presented by (García and Tugores, 2006). In that 
model, two hotels play a two stage game: at the first, the quality of the 
services is chosen by hotels, and then they compete in prices. It is shown 
that hotels choose to offer differentiated services. (Wauthy, 1996), also, 
gives a complete characterization of quality choices in a duopoly model 
of vertical product differentiation, in which firms simultaneously choose 
the quality to offer, and then compete in prices. 
In this article we present a model of vertical differentiation in the 
accommodation industry, where differentiation will be associated with 
quality. Additionally, we assume the existence of a lump sum tax in the 
accommodation sector. Taxing became in fact a very common policy 
instrument, with the aim of controlling the negative impact of tourism on 
the environment. There are many economic studies about tourism 
taxation, as for example (Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005), (Aguiló et al., 
2005), (Jensen and Wanhill, 2002), (Arbel and Ravid, 1983), (Himiestra 
and Ismail, 1992), (Bonham and Gangnes, 1996), (Warnken et al., 2004), 
(Fuji et al., 1985) and (Palmer and Riera, 2003). In this paper such a 
control operates through a demand reduction. This model looks at the 
impact of tourism taxation on the environmental quality, and other 
economic variables. Nevertheless, the value of some parameters, which 
influence the efficiency of that taxation, has been also taken into account. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we will 
introduce the model, which will be solved in the following chapter. In 
section 4, the focus is on how environmental quality and tourism taxation 
interact. Conclusions and further developments are left in the last section. 
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THE MODEL 
 
The model assumes the existence of two hotels: Hotel 1 and Hotel 2. 
They offer different tourism services, which are respectively sold at prices 
1p and 2p . Each tourism service is associated with a parameter 0>iv , 
with 2,1=i , that represents the quality of the service of each hotel. It will 
be supposed that the quality of the service of hotel 1 is higher than in 
hotel 2, that is, .21 vv > then hotel 1 is associated with the best possible 
quality. Further in this paper we assume that the environmental quality of 
the destination equals the sum of the quality of both hotels, i.e. 21 vvv +=
. This assumption is based on the fact that, as we supp.ose, both hotels 
have the same characteristics, and the main difference between them is 
how much they invest in the environmental quality of the destination. 
On the demand side there is a continuum of tourists distributed 
uniformly, with unit density, over the interval [ ]θθ ,1−  ).1( >θ  each 
tourist is defined by a value of the parameter [ ]θθθ ,1−∈ . A higher θ  
represents a tourist that is willing to pay more for a given quality. All 
tourists, at a given price, prefer higher quality, but they differ on the 
willingness to pay for it. Moreover, a higher value of θ  implies that all 
tourists are willing to pay a higher price for quality. As in Tirole (1988) 
θ  can be viewed as the marginal rate of substitution between quality and 
income, which means that, a low value of θ  stands for a high marginal 
utility of income, and therefore a lower income. Thus, this model is 
similar to those once, where consumers differ on their incomes such as 
(Gabszewick and Thisse, 1979) and (Bonano, 1986). 
Each tourist goes for one of the following things: buy the tourism 
service of hotel 1, buy the tourism service of hotel 2, and do not buy at 
all. Additionally, is supposed the existence of a lump sum tax in the 
accommodation sector, which is to be intended in the following way: 
every tourist has to pay a tax when they buy tourism services in both 
hotels. Such an assumption will be soon developed, since the difference 
between those costs is one the most relevant points of our analysis. Given 
the fact that we supp.ose that the cost is higher in hotel 1, we just compute 
the difference of that cost (that is denoted by t ). We assume that the 
differential tax that tourists have to pay in order to buy services from 
hotel 1 is not very high, with respect to the top quality and the willingness 
to pay for it, which produces no demand. In particular (and to simplify the 
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algebra of the model) we assume that
12
1vt θ< . Then a tourist with index 
[ ]θθθ ,1−∈   maximizes the following utility function based on (Tirole, 
1988): 
 





−
−−
=
otherwise                     0
2 hotel frombuy  tourist  theif
1 hotel frombuy  tourist  theif
22
11
pv
tpv
u θ
θ
θ                
(1) 
Note that, as expected, the utility function is increasing, for any given 
prices, with quality and willingness to pay for it. Hotels play the 
following three stage game. First, hotel 1 chooses the quality of the 
tourism service that will offer ( 1v ) from the interval [ ],~,0 v 0~ >v . Then, 
hotel 2 observes 1v and chooses the quality of the service they want to 
offer  2v   from the interval [ ]1,0 v . In the last stage, both hotels choose the 
price simultaneously, having observed 1v  and 2v . To solve the model, is 
used the backward induction, aimed to obtain a sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
 
THE OPTIMAL ELECTION OF QUALITY AND PRICE 
 
To compute the demand that each hotel faces, first we must find the 
indifferences points. Then, we denote as 1θ  the tourist indifferent 
between going to hotel 1 or 2. Using (1) it can be found that: 
21
21
1
)(
vv
tpp
−
+
= −θ                 (2) 
Similarly, 2θ  represents the tourist’s indifference between going to 
hotel 2 or staying at home: 
2
2
2 v
p
=θ                 (3) 
We compute now the demands for both regions. Tourists with 
21/ θθθθ ≤≤− do not buy tourism services in the hotels; if it happ.ens 
12/ θθθθ ≤≤  then the tourist will prefer to buy at hotel 2 rather than 
not to buy. Finally tourists with  θθθθ ≤≤1/  will buy tourism services 
(1) 
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at hotel 1. Then using (2) and (3), the demand functions of both hotels 
will be: 
 
21
21
1
)(
vv
tppD
−
+
−= −θ                (4) 
 
2
2
21
21
2
)(
v
p
vv
tppD −
−
+
= −                (5) 
 
where  iD   is the demand faced by hotel .2,1=i Observe that, as 
asserted in (González and León, 2001), both demand depends positively 
on the quality of the tourist's services. 
To solve the game, we first have to consider the choice of prices of 
both hotels. Then we will study the choice of quality of hotel 2, based on 
the choice of hotel 1. Therefore, the process has to be divided in two 
stages, which we are going to analyze. 
 
Stage 1: As it is usual in industrial economic models, we assume that 
costs of production are zero. Then the problem faced by hotel 1 is to 
select the best price for the tourism service that maximizes its profits  1π  : 






−
+
−== −
21
21
1111
)(maxmaxmax 
vv
tpppDp θπ               (6) 
From the first order conditions it can be found: 
2
)( 212
1
tvvpp −−+= θ                 (7) 
The correspond problem faced by hotel 2 is: 






−
−
+
== −
2
2
21
21
2222
)(maxmax max 
v
p
vv
tpppDpπ               (8) 
Then, solving (8) we have: 
1
12
2 2
)(
v
tpvp +=                 (9) 
If we combine (7) and (9) to find the prices corresponding to the 
Nash equilibrium, we obtain: 
 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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21
2212
2
21
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4
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vv
tvvvvp
vv
vvtvvvp
−
+−
=
−
−−−
=
θ
θ
                                (10) 
Observe that  1p   is decreasing on t . The reason is that if the tax 
increases (that is, if it is more expensive to buy from hotel 1 or cheaper 
from hotel 2), then by (4), the demand for tourist's service of hotel 1 falls, 
causing a decrease in price. A quite similar consideration can be done by 
looking at ,2p however, in this case, the function is increasing on the 
value of the tax. Another interesting point is given by the effects of 
changes in .θ  Given that in (10) both prices are increasing onθ , an 
increase in this parameter will produce an improvement of the prices. 
That is because all tourists are willing to pay more for quality. In this 
respect, if tourists believe that environmental quality is more important, 
then prices will become higher as a consequence. This last result is in line 
with the conclusions of (Keane, 1997), where is explained how prices are 
a sign of the quality of a tourism destination. 
 
Now substitute (10) on (6) and (8) to obtain the profits function of 
both hotels: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )21221
2
2121
2
21
2
12
2
21
2
112
1
4
4
222
vvvv
vvtvv
vvvv
vvvtvtv
−−
−+
=
−−
−+−
=
θθ
π
θθ
π
                       (11) 
 
Stage 2: On the first stage of the game, hotel 1 chooses the quality of 
its services in the interval [ ].~,0 v Then hotel 2, observed the value of 1v , 
chooses 2v  to maximize 2π . As it is asserted by (Wauthy, 1996), 12 vv =
cannot be the best reply of hotel 2, because this choice yields Bertrand 
competition and zero out the profits in the price game. Then 2v must be 
strictly less than .1v The first order conditions for the profits maximization 
of hotel 2 is: 
 
( )( ) 01174240 2121221221312221
2
2 =−++−++−⇔=
∂
∂ vvtvtvvvvvvtvtv
v
θθθθθ
π  (12) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
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Then to maximize its profits, hotel 2 must choose a quality 2v that verify: 
( ) 021 =−+ vvt θθ               (13) 
  or 
 
( ) 0117424 21221221312221 =+−++− vtvvvvvvtvtv θθθ            (14) 
The equation defined by (13) leads to the following solution: 
 
          ( ) 112 1 vtvtv +=+= θθθ                               
(15) 
However, since by hypothesis ,21 vv > this solution must be discarded.  
Then the solution is defined by (14), so that the optimal election of 
quality is2
 
: 
( )( )( )
)72(2
1133)11(
1
1111
2 vt
vtvtvtv
v
θ
θθθ
−
−−+−
=             (16) 
Finally we brought the following values to the equilibrium. They 
stand for the quality of the tourist sector in each hotel: 
 
( )( )( )
)ˆ72(2
ˆ11ˆ33)ˆ11(ˆ
ˆ
2
1
vt
vtvtvtv
v
vv
θ
θθθ
−
−−+−
=
=
∗             (17) 
Now by substituting (17) with (10), we will find the exact 
equilibrium prices. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND TOURISM TAXATION 
 
The model we have solved in the last section will be used now to 
study the effects of changes of some variables in the equilibrium values. 
In this respect, the first important result is the following: 
 
Proposition 1:  If the tourist's willingness to pay for quality increases, 
                                                          
2See appendix I for the details. 
 
 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
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then: 
 
1) The demand for tourism services faced by hotel 1 (the best quality 
hotel) increases by more than the demand of hotel 2. 
2) The price for tourism services of hotel 1 increases by more than the 
price of hotel 2. 
3) The quality level of tourism services offered by hotel 2 decreases. 
 
Proof: 
1) When equation (10), is substituted by (4) and (5), we find that: 
( )( )2121
21211
1 4
)2()(2
vvvv
vvtvvvD
−−
−−−
=
θ             (18) 
( )( )2121
1211
2 4
)(
vvvv
tvvvvD
−−
+−
=
θ              (19) 
Now can be computed the derivative of both demands respect :θ   
21
11
4
2
vv
vD
−
=
∂
∂
θ
                 (20) 
21
12
4 vv
vD
−
=
∂
∂
θ
                 (21) 
Then, since 01 >
∂
∂
θ
D  and ,02 >
∂
∂
θ
D  an increase in the tourist's 
willingness to pay for environmental quality, produces an increment of 
the demand faced by both hotels. However, since 
θθ ∂
∂
>
∂
∂ 21 DD  ,the 
increase of demand for hotel 1 is higher than the change of the demand 
for hotel 2; this is a logical assertion, since the tourist's services given by 
hotel 1 is the best possible quality. 
 
2) The increase of the demand proved in the last point produces an 
increase in prices and, as predictable, the price for tourism service of hotel 
1 increases by more than the price of hotel 2. In fact, by computing 
θ∂
∂ ip  
will be found that: 
( )
21
2111
4
2
vv
vvvp
−
−
=
∂
∂
θ
                 (22) 
 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
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( )
21
2122
4 vv
vvvp
−
−
=
∂
∂
θ
                 (23)  
 
Moreover ,21
θθ ∂
∂
>
∂
∂ pp  means that the change in the price of hotel 1 is 
bigger than the change in the case of hotel 2. 
3) In appendix II we will prove that .02 <
∂
∂ ∗
θ
v  An increase in the tourist's 
willingness to pay for quality, produces a decrement in the quality of 
tourism services given by hotel 2. Since a high θ  produces a higher 
demand that tourism destination faces, leading to a development in such 
areas, as many authors observed, (see for example (Pintassilgo and Silva, 
2007)), this has a negative effect on the environmental quality of the 
tourism destination. Therefore, in order to minimize this effect, a taxation 
policy can be successfully introduced. It is then important to study the 
effect of the possible variation of this tax, in respect to the quality of the 
tourism service offered. Look carefully at the following statements: 
 
Proposition 2: An increase of the value of the tourism tax leads to a 
higher quality of the tourism services of hotel 2, and to an increase of the 
total environmental quality of the tourism destination. Additionally, a low 
value of the tourist's willingness to pay for quality, leads to a higher effect 
of the tourism tax. 
Proof: in Appendix II we present the proof of .02 >
∂
∂ ∗
t
v The economic 
reason for it is that, an increment of the tourism taxation decreases the 
demand faced by hotel 1 (see equation (4)), forcing this hotel to increase 
its quality in order to hold its demand. Nevertheless, the quality of hotel 2 
increases as well, to maximize its benefits. In fact, it can be easily 
explained that 0
1
2 >
∂
∂ ∗
v
v by using the algebra; therefore, the total 
environmental quality of the tourism destination increases, and 
additionally, we will give proof that:  
t
vtv
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂ ∗∗ 22
θθ
                 (24) 
Thus, if the willingness to pay for quality has a low value, then, to 
compensate a decrease in the environmental quality, generated by an 
TOURISMOS: AN INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF TOURISM 
Volume 4, Number 1, Spring 2009, pp. 45-62 
 55 
increase of θ , the tourism tax must increase less than if the willingness 
to pay for quality has a high value. If the parameterθ is viewed as the 
tourist’s income level, then a high value of θ implies that the tax that 
each tourist pays has to increase more than if the level income were 
lower; this to recover the loose of environmental quality, caused by an 
increase in the demand. Many authors have studied the effects of tourism 
taxation, and in particular (Palmer and Riera, 2003) analyzed the effects 
of the application of an environmental tax in the Balearic Islands. Also for 
this case, (Aguiló et al., 2005) observed and estimated the demand 
decrease as a consequence of the 'Balearic Ecotax'. Thus, taxation is a 
policy instrument to maintain the environmental quality of a tourism 
destination high, but its efficiency depends, according to this model, on 
the value of the tourist's willingness to pay for environmental quality, or 
similar, on the tourist’s income level. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The accommodation industry impacts, and is affected, by the natural 
environment. On one hand, tourism as all economics activities directly 
affects the environment through the movement of people and vehicles, 
and the abuse of natural resources and infrastructures. On the other hand, 
the tourism sector depends of the natural environment: in fact, the 
environmental quality of a tourism destination is an important tool that 
hotels have to hold the demand. A very important consequence of such 
interdependency is that open market access may lead to an 
overexploitation in an economic and environmental context, and could 
therefore destroy the region as a tourism destination. For this reason, 
many authors recommend the utilization of policy instruments to control 
the negative impact of tourism on the environment. A very common 
instrument is the accommodation taxes, already used, in fact, by many 
countries and regions. 
In this paper we present a model of vertical differentiation in the 
accommodation industry, where differentiation is associated with quality. 
Additionally, we suppose the existence of a lump sum tax in such sector. 
Two main results have been proved in this paper. First, if the tourist's 
willingness to pay for quality increases then: both the demand and the 
price for tourism services increase, however, the increment of the demand 
for best quality gets higher, and the environmental quality level of 
tourism destination decreases. Second, an increase in the value of the 
Juan Gabriel Brida & Juan S. Pereyra  
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tourism tax leads to a better quality of the tourism services of the top 
quality hotel, causing an increase of the total environmental quality of the 
tourism destination as well. Thus, taxation is a policy instrument which 
maintains the environmental quality of a tourism destination, but its 
efficiency depends on the value of the tourist's willingness to pay for 
quality, or similar, on the tourist's level of income. In this respect, if the 
willingness to pay for quality has a low value, and then, to compensate a 
decrease of the environmental quality produced by an increase of  θ , the 
tourism tax must increase less than if the willingness to pay for quality 
has a high value. All this results are in line with many empirical studies 
that have been conducted in the last years; it reaffirms the important idea 
of the necessity of public policies aimed to protect the natural 
environment, through the regulation of the accommodation industry, 
always based on the principles of efficiency, efficacy and equity. 
This study can be extended by modifying the tax type, or by 
including more hotels and changing the game that hotels play. The 
horizontal dimension can be also included to compare the results obtained 
in this article, and to analyze the interaction between horizontal and 
vertical differentiation. As suggested by the discussants of our paper in 
the "First Conference of The International Association for Tourism 
Economics", one way to improve and/or achieve new results, is to use a 
different definition for the quality of the region. For instance, we can use 
a weighted meaning for the quality of the two hotels. All these points can 
be material of future research. 
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APPENDIX I 
The profit function of hotel 2 is: 
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θθπ                  (25) 
 
In order to maximize this function, hotel 2 must choose a quality level of 
its services that verifies the following equation (26): 
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As from the text, the second factor of the equation must be discarded 
since, in that case: 
 
( ) 1112 1 vvtvtv >+=+= θθθ                  (27) 
 
Also by hypothesis we have that .21 vv > Then the optimal choice of 2v  
must verify: 
 
    ( ) 0117424 21221221312221 =+−++− vtvvvvvvtvtv θθθ              (28) 
 
The positive root of this equation is: 
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The following two facts have to be verified: 120 vv << ∗  and that (25) have 
a maximum on (29). 
To prove the first point, it is important to write (29) as: 
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        ( )( ) )(31133 111 vtvtvt θθθ −>−−                               (33) 
 
The last inequality is true, since by the hypothesis of the model, .01 <− vt θ   
Similarly can be also proved that .02 >∗v   
Now to prove that on (29) 2π  presents a maximum, must be computed the 
second derivative of (25), and evaluated on (29). So: 
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Since 0
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11
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−
−
vt
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θ
θ , (25) have a maximum on (29) if: 
 
( )( ) ( ) 01133113)4( 11111 >−−+−+−+ vtvvtvtvt θθθθθ                 (35) 
 
But this is correct since ( ) .011 1 <− vt θ   
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APPENDIX II 
Proof of Proposition 1 c): 
Since the optimal choice for the quality level of tourism services that 
hotel 2 offers is: 
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the derivate in respect to θ  can be computed as follows   
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Then, in order to prove that 02 <
∂
∂ ∗
θ
v  just observe that: 
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(38) 
But the last inequality is true since, by hypothesis .
12
1vt θ<   
Proof of Proposition 2): We must prove that .02 >
∂
∂ ∗
t
v  And again after 
computing the derivate of the optimal choice of the quality level of 
tourism services that hotel 2 offers in respect to   we obtain that: 
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Given the last prove, is appears now clear that .02 >
∂
∂ ∗
t
v  Also note that if 
(39) is compared with (37) it is easy to verify that: 
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